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1Introduction
Seed fairs linked with vouchers are more commonly being implemented as an alternative to direct, free 
seed distribution under relief and recovery programs in Zimbabwe. This model was first introduced by 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in 2002, following the successful application of such programs in eastern 
Africa. Interest in this strategy has grown amidst the annual implementation of humanitarian assistance 
programs. By the 2005/06 summer planting season, 10 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were 
organizing more than 100 seed fairs distributed across 23 districts in the country. More than 36,000 
farmers received vouchers allowing them to purchase seed at these fairs. 
The growing number of seed fairs, and increasing investment in their implementation, justifies a closer 
assessment of their impacts. Are seed fairs more effective than directly distributing relief seed to farmers? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of seed fairs relative to direct seed distribution? How can the 
seed fair model be improved? 
The Seed Fair and Voucher Model
This study examines a specific sort of seed fair model encompassing the organization of an informal seed 
market for the purposes of supplying seed in exchange for vouchers. The supply of seed may be derived 
from local farmers, local traders, input dealers and seed companies. The demand for seed is linked with 
the distribution of vouchers to households determined to be in need. Needy farmers exchange their 
vouchers for seed of their choice. And at the end of the fair, seed sellers redeem the vouchers they have 
collected in exchange for cash.
Seed fairs were first introduced in Zimbabwe by the Community Technology Development Trust (CTDT) 
in the mid-1990s simply as a means to promote trade of traditional varieties between neighboring 
households. No vouchers were involved. Seed companies generally did not attend these fairs. Rather, the 
intention was to encourage the use and preservation of traditional varieties. 
Vouchers have been used in the country both as means to ration scarce commodities and as inducements 
to purchase certain goods and services. In the context of relief programs, vouchers were first commonly 
applied in 1999 as a means to wean farmers from several years of free seed distribution under drought 
and flood relief programs. Under this government program, groups of farmers were provided vouchers 
to offset part of the transport costs incurred when making bulk purchases of seed and fertilizer. This was 
meant to facilitate purchases from distant wholesalers offering more favorable prices. 
In recent years, CARE has employed vouchers to facilitate seed and fertilizer purchases at rural retail 
shops. Shop owners were provided training in business practices and originally linked with seed and 
fertilizer companies willing to provide agricultural inputs. High rates of inflation and the growing risk of 
default have discouraged the direct provision of inputs and during the last few years CARE has purchased 
the seed and fertilizer to be distributed through these programs. 
The standard seed fairs and voucher model, developed by CRS and the International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in East Africa, is outlined in Table 1. This has been 
modified in a number of ways by various NGOs in Zimbabwe. The level of community responsibility for 
the organization and operation of the seed fair has varied. The range of participating traders has sometimes 
been restricted. At least one NGO has limited the type of seed on offer – in this case restricting sales 
of maize seed in drought-prone environments. In some cases, vouchers were redeemable for additional 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. In most fairs, seed prices were set prior to the initiation of the 
market. In one case, the seed fair involved a simple exchange of a voucher for a packet of seed – though 
many would not call this a seed fair per se. 
2Table 1. Common steps underlying the implementation of a seed fair with vouchers 
Activity Actions
Assessment of need •  Identify district/ward/villages in need
•  Characterize availability and need for seed
•  Identify number of beneficiaries 
•  Calculate seed requirements
Planning •  Determine voucher value, design and organize printing
•  Meet with local authorities to plan seed fair
•  Meet with target communities to explain seed fair
•  Beneficiary selection and registration
•  Select seed fair date and venue
•  Identify local organizing committee 
•  Mobilize external seed sources such as seed companies and agro-dealers
Implementation •  Clarify the rules
•  Register sellers, seed crops, varieties and quantities
•  Conduct a seed quality inspection
•  Distribute vouchers
•  Exchange vouchers for seed
•  Reconcile vouchers and pay sellers
Evaluation •  Conduct a debriefing session of buyers and sellers
•  Conduct a post-fair evaluation
Source: Adapted from CRS, ODI and ICRISAT 2002.
Seed fairs were originally developed in eastern Africa to cope with problems of the limited availability of 
seed of well-adapted varieties for distribution under humanitarian relief programs. Formal markets only 
provided access to limited quantities of seed or a limited range of varieties. To make matters worse, some 
of the varieties being provided were not suited for production in the drought-prone environments where 
such distribution programs were being implemented. CRS realized, however, that seed losses in the 
event of drought (or flooding or civil conflict) were rarely complete. In many instances, some community 
members had been able to produce a limited crop or retained seed that could be sold to their neighbors. 
In addition, stocks of surplus seed were often available from neighboring communities. The fairs originally 
allowed the recipients of aid to choose to purchase seed from companies or from their neighbors. The 
fact of choice improved the chances the seed would be planted and that a harvest would result.
If seed is locally available in informal village markets, questions arise about why an external intervention 
is needed. The existence of this seed belies the common assumption that farmers generally lose or 
consume their seed in the event of drought, floods and civil conflict. The justification for the intervention 
then rests on the assumption that poorer or more vulnerable households remain with an access constraint. 
While seed may be available in the community, it is not widely accessible either because of a lack of 
purchasing power or because market constraints limit information about seed availability, or limit the 
likelihood of a transaction between farmers with extra seed and those in need of stocks. The seed fair and 
voucher program resolves these access constraints by providing purchasing power to needy households 
in the form of a voucher. Also, organization of the fair improves communication about seed stocks and 
facilitates links between a wider range of sellers and buyers. In effect, the seed fair resolves a market 
failure while improving the welfare of poorer or vulnerable households. 
3Impact Assessment Criteria
The assessment of the impact of the seed fairs should be based on a clearly defined set of impact criteria. 
In this case, we are interested in comparing the impacts of seed fairs with the impacts of direct seed 
distribution to needy households. This is essentially the decision facing NGOs and donors. What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of distributing seed directly or through seed fairs? And which strategy for 
seed distribution is more cost effective?
Table 2 summarizes some of the advantages and disadvantages commonly cited for implementing seed 
fairs versus direct seed distribution. Unfortunately, there is limited evaluative data underlying these 
perceptions. While some of these criteria appear true virtually by definition – for example, the breadth 
of choice of varieties at seed fairs – others likely depend on how each of the two distribution strategies 
are implemented. A more detailed analysis of seed fair operations in Zimbabwe allows the collection of 
quantitative information necessary to assess these claims. Such an analysis also provides evidence of how 
each methodology may be improved. 
Table 2. Advantages and disadvantages of seed fairs and direct seed distribution
Seed fairs Direct seed distribution
Advantages
• Wider choice of seed crops and varieties
• Chosen seed is more likely to be planted
• Farmers have access to traditional varieties 
• Agro-biodiversity enhanced
• Encourages local seed production
• Seed is cheaper
• Money retained in community
• Strengthens rural seed markets
Disadvantages
• More time and labor required to implement
• Additional training required
• Access to new varieties may be restricted
• More expensive to implement
Advantages
• Easier to implement
• Cheaper to implement
• Greater assurance that seed is available for those most in  
                need
• Improves access to new varieties
• Quality of seed provided is more assured
Disadvantages
• Seed may not be adapted to environment
• Farmers may received seed crops of little interest
• Undermines rural markets
• Seed is more expensive
Source: Adapted from Leonardo (ed.) 2003.
Research Methodology
The research plan for this review study encompassed two main surveys. A reconnaissance survey was 
conducted during the course of the seed fairs themselves. This allowed observation of the methods 
of implementation of a cross section of seed fairs. Semi-formal interviews were conducted with a 
cross section of seed fair participants including farmers buying seed, farmers selling seed, seed traders, 
community leaders and NGO representatives.
A second set of more formal surveys were conducted during the post-planting period. This covered a 
cross section of seed recipients from both seed fairs and from direct distribution programs, as well as a 
cross section of seed sellers from both programs. 
Supplementary interviews were conducted with seed companies and NGOs to clarify issues of 
implementation and gather information for the cost effectiveness analysis. 
4Implementation Surveys
The field visits were carried out between mid-September and early November 2005. A list of all 
NGOs known to be implementing seed fairs with vouchers targeting vulnerable households was first 
compiled. This proved difficult because NGO plans were still changing during the period of initial seed 
fair operations. Ultimately, it was determined that 10 NGOs were planning seed fairs in 23 different 
districts in the country. More than 36,000 farmers were targeted to receive vouchers (FAO 2006).
Some NGOs were still learning how best to implement seed fairs. Those entering their first year of 
implementation were excluded from the sample. This helped assure a fairer representation of more 
skilled implementation efforts. 
One of the key questions underlying the implementation strategies chosen by various NGOs was ensuring 
a sufficient quantity of seed to support the redemption of all available vouchers. Questions had arisen 
about the availability of seed, and thus the viability of the standard seed fair model, in the drier regions 
of the country. Therefore, all districts were sorted by Natural Regions and classified according to whether 
they were largely based in the wetter (Natural Regions I, II and II) or drier regions (Natural Regions IV 
and V). 
The implementation surveys sought to encompass as many NGOs as possible in both wetter and drier 
regions. Ultimately, the sample encompassed eight different NGOs coordinating seed fairs in 15 districts 
of the country. These eight NGOs worked under funding obtained from four lead partners (Table 3). 
The survey team sought to witness seed fairs in two wards in each district – though this ultimately 
proved difficult due to scheduling problems. Multiple seed fairs were running on the same days and 
long distances had to be covered. The survey schedule was further complicated by the fact that NGOs 
sometimes changed the date of the seed fair with limited notice. On occasion, the sample team arrived 
in a location only to be told that the seed fair had been postponed. These field visits were conducted 
between mid-September and early November 2005. 
Table 3. Sample of NGOs and districts for the seed fair study
NGOs funding seed fairs
NGOs implementing seed 
fair
District where seed fair was 
implemented
Number of seed fair sites visited per district 
during implementation
Oxfam GB Oxfam GB Zvishavane 2
Chirumhanzu 2
RUDO Gutu 2
Masvingo 1
CRS CTDT Chiredzi 2
Mutoko 2
Murehwa 2
Tsholotsho 2
NFN Chipinge 2
FACHIG Guruve 2
Muzarabani 1
Rushinga 2
CAFOD ZWP Chivi 1
CADEC Mutare Nyanga 2
SCF (UK) SCF (UK) Binga 1
5Post-Planting Surveys
Three formal post-planting surveys were conducted. The first encompassed a random sample of farmers purchasing 
seed (in exchange for vouchers) at the fairs. The second survey targeted a random selection of households in 
neighboring wards who had received seed by means of direct distribution. The third survey targeted a random 
cross section of local seed sellers – principally farmers who had sold seed to other farmers at the fairs. 
Nine districts were chosen from the original list of 15 where the reconnaissance surveys were performed. 
These were purposefully chosen to represent districts where the original CRS–ICRISAT seed fair and voucher 
model (Table 1) appeared to be most consistently applied. In order to test the hypothesis that seed fairs were 
more successful in high potential rainfall areas (due to the better availability of seed), districts were further 
divided into those falling in high rainfall potential areas and low rainfall potential areas (Table 4).
Table 4. Sample for post-planting seed fair surveys, 2006
Region District
Sample of seed fair 
households
Sample directly distributed 
households Sample of seed sellers
High rainfall Mutoko 33 17 5
Murehwa 32 16 13
Nyanga 34 15 6
Chirumhanzu 32 15 20
Gutu 30 15 19
Low rainfall Tsholotsho 31 15 13
Chiredzi 28 17 7
Chipinge 30 15 0 
Chivi 30 15 0 
Total 280 140 83
How Seed Fairs are Implemented
A standard description of seed fair implementation procedures can be found in CRS, ODI and ICRISAT 
(2002). The implementation procedures employed by NGOs in Zimbabwe varied from this in important 
ways (Mazvimavi et al. 2005). The following discussion highlights some of the implementation issues 
specific to Zimbabwe.
Assessing the Need for a Seed Fair
Several months before the beginning of the planting season, NGOs commonly consulted with local 
authorities and community leaders about the level of agricultural input assistance required in targeted 
areas. The choice of which communities to assist was heavily influenced by each NGO’s previous levels 
of engagement with various communities. Most NGOs also made an effort to confirm that their activities 
were not duplicating the efforts of other NGOs in each district.
Seed fair practitioners commonly suggest the need to start preparations with an assessment of local seed 
stocks. However, in practice, this is difficult, because farmers tend to hide their harvests in anticipation 
of qualifying for food aid. This problem has increased as a result of the multiple years of aid provided by 
humanitarian agencies in the country.
In general, areas with poorer harvests were assumed to have seed shortages. Yet, in order to run a seed 
fair, some quantities of seed must still be locally available. The concept of the fair assumes that the 
6principle constraint is one of access – poorer households do not have access to seed that may be available 
to better endowed households because of their status in the community or simple lack of resources. The 
sample frame was organized to allow a test of the proposition that seed supply was a constraint to the 
operation of fairs in lower rainfall regions.
The use of village seed markets reduces the need to worry about whether available seed is suited to local 
environments and acceptable to farmers. However, most of the NGOs also sought to assure community 
access to commercial maize seed. This largely reflects the historical willingness of Zimbabwean farmers 
to purchase quality maize seed each year.  
Finally, each of the NGOs sought the assistance of local community leaders in defining a list of beneficiaries. 
Again, whereas a number of criteria are commonly proposed to define vulnerable households, the final 
choice involves some negotiation with local authorities. In many cases this list was still being revised on 
the day of the seed fair.
Planning
The dates for each seed fair were commonly set in consultation with local stakeholders including AREX 
staff and community leaders. The latter were then given the task of mobilizing local seed sellers. 
NGOs then ordered vouchers, equipment and other promotional materials to be used at the fairs. The NGOs 
printed varying numbers of vouchers. Farmers commented that the distribution of many vouchers of small 
denominations was more useful than the distribution of a few high-value ones. This facilitated choice. NGOs 
that hosted HIV/AIDS campaign groups contacted such people to be available on the day of the seed fair.
It was common for the timing of the seed fair to change late in the schedule. Changes might even be 
announced on the day when the fair was to be held. The rescheduling of seed fairs was said to be caused 
by delays in accessing seed from outside traders, the late receipt of funding, the late printing of vouchers, 
and scheduling conflicts in NGO programs.
Implementation
Seed fairs were implemented by a combination of stakeholders including NGO staff, AREX staff, civil 
and traditional leaders, and some selected farmers. The components of implementation were similar at 
all seed fairs visited, although details varied from one site to the next. The first stage at all sites was a 
public address by an implementing agency employee in the local vernacular of the area. Instructions were 
given on the proceedings of the day. 
In all locations visited, prices were established on the day of the seed fair. In a few cases these were 
simply announced by the implementing NGO. But in most cases, NGO staff facilitated price negotiations 
between seed sellers, buyers and community leaders. 
Visual seed quality examinations were conducted by AREX officers at most of the sites visited. However, 
there were very few cases of sellers being turned away because of the poor quality of their seed. This 
effectively allowed farmers to choose to buy seed of varying quality. Since seed prices were predetermined, 
however, these failed to reflect quality differentials. 
Sellers were formally registered at all of the seed fairs, and the quantities brought were recorded. Some 
NGOs used scales to measure the quantities of seed brought, whereas others simply counted containers. 
Several NGOs restricted the crops that could be sold at the seed fairs. For example, in certain areas, 
maize and sugar beans were not allowed. There were concerns that food insecure farmers might consume 
the sugar beans instead of planting the seed. In most cases, however, any seed crop could be sold. 
7At many seed fairs, farmers were encouraged to first use their vouchers to purchase commercial maize seed. 
After receiving their vouchers, farmers were lined up to obtain their maize seed. This practice encouraged 
the efforts of external traders or seed companies to supply maize seed at most of the fairs. It was clear 
that most farmers also placed priority on buying this seed. But in a few cases farmers complained that they 
would have preferred to obtain more seed of other crops such as groundnuts. The high cost of maize seed 
meant that the largest proportion of vouchers were redeemed for this input. 
The seed fair was generally an open event to local communities. Some NGOs encouraged the participation 
of non-voucher beneficiaries to witness the event, and also watch HIV/AIDS education programs.
At several sites NGO staff and local leaders had to deal with disputes about the distribution of vouchers. 
Beneficiary lists sometimes had to be revised when there was evidence that wealthier households had 
been selected for the program, or that vulnerable households had been missed.
There were no specific instructions guiding the order in which vulnerable households received their 
vouchers. This order was important because the early recipients had first choice of the seed on offer, 
and did not have to wait in long queues to obtain their maize seed. Farmers who received vouchers later 
sometimes lost the opportunity to purchase preferred seed types, such as legume seeds. 
Evaluation
Several NGOs brought in teams of enumerators to administer a quick assessment questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was most commonly directed to seed buyers in order to obtain their views of the seed fair 
procedures and pricing, and to gather suggestions for improvement. Some NGOs planned to conduct 
additional surveys after planting to assess the impact of seed fairs on production. 
Sources of Seed Supply
The seed supplied to most seed fairs was derived from a combination of commercial and non-commercial 
sources. Many NGOs particularly encouraged seed supply from local farmers. This helped assure the 
availability of seed crops and varieties that are suited to the local agro-ecology and favored by the 
recipient households. Purchases of local seed are also believed to help assure the maintenance of agro-
biodiversity. 
However, NGOs commonly worry about the risks of not having enough seed to redeem all of the 
distributed vouchers. This was particularly a worry with respect to maize seed. NGOs knew farmers 
generally seek such seed from the commercial market, but they could not be sure that seed companies or 
seed traders would appear with adequate supplies. In order to reduce these risks, most NGOs sought close 
relationships with particular seed traders or agro-dealers supplying the dominant share of this input.  
Participation of Farmers Selling Seed
Widely variable numbers of farmers participated in the various seed fairs monitored. These ranged from 
as few as 15 farmers to as many as 95 farmers in the various fairs (Table 5). The number of seed sellers 
appears to have been partly related to the level of rainfall in the targeted area. In low rainfall areas there 
were fewer local farmers selling seed, compared to high rainfall areas.
However, the number of local sellers was also clearly influenced by the strategies employed for gathering 
participation. In several seed fairs it was clear that farmers were reluctant to bring seed for sale because 
they thought this would disqualify them from receiving other sorts of aid in the future. In at least one 
ward, local officials warned farmers about this possibility. But in other areas, NGOs successfully worked 
with local community leaders to encourage local seed sellers to come to the fair.
8Table 5. Number of seed sellers at selected seed fair sites
Region District Sites visited
Number of voucher 
beneficiaries Local farmers Agro-dealers Seed companies
High rainfall Mutoko 2 600 16 2 0
Murehwa 2 600 17 3 0
Nyanga 2 800 39 1 3
Chirumhanzu 2 169 95 0 0
Gutu 2 541 93 6 0
Total 10 2710 260 12 3
Low rainfall Chiredzi 2 600 28 2 0
Tsholotsho 2 630 17 2 0
Chipinge 2 500 20 8 2
Chivi 1 1000 15 10 3
Total 7 2730 80 22 5
This problem has likely been worsened by the persistence of a range of different humanitarian relief 
programs during the past four years. Many farmers have become accustomed to claiming they are in need 
and expecting assistance – in the form of seed, fertilizer, gardening advice, conservation farming advice, or 
food aid. If seed fairs continue, NGOs may need to consider rewarding seed sellers – possibly with access 
to small packets of new varieties, or with advisory assistance to help them improve their seed production.
Results from the interviews with seed sellers show that 75% of the sellers have more than five years 
experience in selling local seed. Most are regular sellers of seed in the informal village market. These are 
generally better-than-average farmers who tend to produce more than their neighbors even in the event 
of drought. Many are well known in their communities as seed suppliers. 
Participation of Seed Companies
The larger national seed companies were generally reluctant to become involved in seed fairs. Region a l 
representatives of these companies only participated in three out of the nine districts covered by this study. 
Companies commonly state that their participation in these seed fairs is not profitable. The costs of 
transporting seed are high, as are the risks of failing to sell what is offered. Furthermore, most seed 
companies believed they could earn more money selling most of their stocks in response to larger tenders 
to the government or to free seed distribution programs run by various NGOs. Why pursue an uncertain 
retail market when most seed could be sold in large lots from the company’s warehouse?
Several companies sought to encourage other agro-dealers to buy their seed, and market it at the fairs. 
This included several small-scale traders who had never previously sold seed.
It is unlikely this situation will change as long as a large share of relief seed continues to be distributed 
through free, direct distribution. 
Participation of Other Agro-Dealers
Two types of agro-dealers participated in most of the fairs – those identifiable as local agents for particular 
companies, and general traders who either started selling seed in response to the fairs, or sold seed as one 
of a number of commodities in general merchandise shops. 
Most NGOs sought the participation of particular agro-dealers who would assure the availability of a 
minimum supply of maize seed. Several NGOs negotiated specific agreements with these traders before 
the seed fair, and maintained close communication about the levels of maize seed stocks needed at each 
fair in order to redeem the available vouchers. 
9While the NGOs did not restrict the participation of multiple agro-dealers, the numbers participating 
in any given seed fair were small. In several cases, only one agro-dealer showed up. By appearance, 
competition was not encouraged. Agro-dealers interviewed commonly stated that they did not know of 
the existence of many of the fairs they failed to attend. The smaller numbers of commercial seed sellers 
may have contributed to an increase in average selling prices for maize seed. 
The procedure of first lining farmers up to purchase their maize seed helped ensure that agro-dealers who 
were enlisted were paid. This also reduced the risks that farmers would end up with more vouchers than 
the seed available. 
An alternative way to resolve these risks was to separate the distribution of maize seed from the operation 
of the fair. One NGO directly distributed maize seed to each household, and supported the fairs as a 
means to supply seed of other major crops. Another NGO provided maize seed in exchange for vouchers 
at a local retail shop while reserving the fair for seed of any other crop.
Seed Quantities Supplied and Sold
There appear to have been no specific instructions regarding the quantities and types of seed that could 
be sold at the fairs. A wide range of varieties of seed crops were available. These included sorghum, pearl 
millet, finger millet, groundnut, cowpea, bambaranut, sunflower, soybean, and sesame seed (Table 6). Very 
few local farmers brought any maize seed, and generally this was in small quantities. Few also brought in 
vegetable seed. The reason for this remains uncertain. Some sellers thought they were supposed to bring 
seed of other field crops, while commercial suppliers could be expected to provide the maize. Several 
agro-dealers understood that vegetable seed should be reserved for winter season distribution.  
Table 6. Quantities of seed sold by different sellers at seed fairs (kg) 
District
Hybrid 
maize
OPV 
maize Sorghum
Pearl
 millet Finger millet Groundnut
Bamb-
aranut Cowpea Other
High High 
rainfall
(2710 buyers)
Seed company 9670 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agro-dealer 850 9800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Local farmer 0 20 205 457 190 933 490 32 522
Total 10520 9820 205 457 190 933 490 32 522
Low rainfall
(2730 buyers)
Seed company 12400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agro-dealer 2980 4630 0 0 0 196 0 113 0
Local farmer 0 60 1265 70 30 195 137 80 69
Total 15380 4690 1265 70 30 391 137 193 69
Due to the nature of the relationship between NGOs and a few agro-dealers, most fairs were dominated by 
the supply of either a single variety of open pollinated maize seed (generally ZM 521), or a single variety of 
hybrid maize seed. In effect, most farmers did not have a choice of what type of maize seed to purchase. In 
those fairs where both open pollinated maize and hybrid maize seed were available, the majority of farmers 
appear to have preferred the hybrid selection. Many complaints were received about the ZM 521 open 
pollinated maize seed on offer, with farmers stating that it had performed poorly in previous years. But a 
few complaints were also received about the poor performance of hybrid maize seed – particularly from one 
company. Farmers commonly suggested the need for more choice. 
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Maize seed accounted for almost 80% of the total quantity of seed sold at seed fairs from the nine 
districts surveyed. This high volume and amount partly reflects the links between NGOs and agro-
dealers described above. But in addition, it appears that the majority of buyers placed priority on the 
purchase of maize seed. Most of Zimbabwe’s farmers are well accustomed to purchasing hybrid maize 
seed each season. While open pollinated varieties have been introduced as an option allowing farmers 
to save money on seed by not purchasing fresh seed each season, most farmers seem to recognize the 
yield advantages offered by hybrids. Most are willing to continue to pay for this seed each year; though 
if an NGO is willing to provide this seed for free (perhaps through a voucher) farmers are even happier. 
Farmers recognize they can generally find seed for other open pollinated crops from their own stocks or 
the village market. 
Local seed traders in high rainfall regions had larger quantities of more different types of seed to sell, than the 
local traders in drier areas (Figure 1). In high rainfall areas, groundnut, bambaranut, pearl millet and other 
crops such as sunflower seed dominated local sales. In low rainfall zones, sorghum was the predominant 
seed crop sold, though farmers commonly complained about the lack of adequate quantities of seed of 
various legume crops.  Also, the costs of legume seed were perceived to be expensive, particularly given that 
the largest share of vouchers had to be redeemed first for maize. 
Figure 1. Quantities of seed sold by local farmers by rainfall region.
Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of seed sales in fairs dominated either by the availability of open 
pollinated maize seed or hybrid maize seed – often as a result of the dominance of a particular agro-dealer. 
In the districts where hybrid maize seed was available, this accounted for 87% of the total quantity of seed 
sold. In districts were open pollinated maize seed was available, this accounted for 78% of the seed sold, and 
the combination of hybrid and open pollinated maize seed accounted for almost 90% of total sales. 
Correspondingly, sales of maize seed accounted for more than 90% of the total value of seed sold at the 
fairs. By inference, the vast majority of seed investment left the local community and ended up in the 
hands of urban-based agro-dealers and seed companies. 
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Seed Fair Pricing
NGOs and seed sellers fixed prices for all transactions at every fair. Often this was done in consultation 
with local community leaders on the day of the fair. However, the similarity of prices at many fairs 
suggests that NGO staff had a strong role in these discussions. This contrasts with the common practice 
at seed fairs in other countries. In east Africa and neighboring Mozambique, buyers and sellers at seed 
fairs were individually allowed to negotiate prices for each transaction. Price competition between sellers 
was encouraged. 
Figure 2. Distribution of seed sales 
at seed fairs dominated by open 
pollinated varieties.
Figure 3. Distribution of seed sales at 
seed fairs dominated by hybrid maize.
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The decision to set prices in Zimbabwe has been pursued as a means to reduce risks at the fairs. This is 
said to reduce the chances that seed traders may exploit seed buyers. In addition, it speeds the process of 
transactions. Pre-knowledge of the maize price also helps NGOs set the value of vouchers on offer. 
Agro-dealers invited to bring larger quantities of maize seed from Harare sometimes negotiated their 
prices with the NGO in advance. This agreement might still be subject to confirmation at the fair itself. 
But each company sought an assurance that it could cover its transport costs, accommodation costs and 
labor costs before it would agree to travel to the designated fairs.   
Generally, seed fair prices were higher than local seed prices for all the major crops sold. Open pollinated 
maize seed provided by agro-dealers generally sold for Z$35,000 to Z$40,000 per kilogram depending on 
the location of the fair. The prices of hybrid maize seed were generally a bit higher than this. 
Unexpectedly, the hybrid maize seed offered at many fairs was more expensive than that offered in 
local retail shops (Figure 4). In two districts, this seed was as much as 60% more costly in the fairs. The 
justification for this is unclear. Local retail shops would be expected to have higher prices to account for 
local overheads, and the costs of stocking seed over a longer period. Seed company agents selling at the fairs 
should have had particularly favorable prices given their access to wholesale pricing. These circumstances 
suggest that NGOs, and farmers, were forced to accept higher seed prices from the companies and agro-
dealers in order to assure adequate stocks were available to redeem all distributed vouchers. 
Figure 4. Hybrid maize seed prices at seed fairs and local retail markets.
Designated sorghum seed prices at the fairs were consistently double the prices of sorghum grain, the 
main alternative source of sorghum seed, in local village markets (Figure 5). In several areas the seed 
prices at the fairs were more than five times these grain prices. This difference may be partly explained 
by efforts of seed sellers to clean their grain to a higher quality for sale at the fair. But it is also apparent 
that this sorghum seed was overpriced relative to the local market value. In practice, it appears that 
sorghum seed prices at the fairs were set in coordination with the prices for open pollinated maize seed, 
even though the latter was commercially produced and treated seed.
Groundnut seed at the fairs was also commonly priced at double the levels recorded in local grain markets 
for shelled product (Figure 6). For unknown reasons, the price of groundnut seed was particularly high in 
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the seed fairs operated in Chivi. Here the fair price was almost four times higher than the local market 
price for grain. Farmers complained about such high prices – suggesting that the value of their remaining 
vouchers, after purchasing maize, allowed them to obtain very little legume seed.
Bambaranut seed was generally priced at the same rate as groundnut, although local bambaranut prices 
tend to be cheaper than groundnut at local village markets. Cowpea prices were generally cheaper than 
groundnut seed prices across the districts, although some implementing NGOs established a common 
price for all legumes. 
Figure 5. Sorghum seed prices at seed fairs and local grain markets.
Figure 6. Groundnut seed prices at seed fairs and local grain markets.
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Complaints by farmers raised concerns about the possibility that the establishment of very high seed 
prices at the fairs may contribute to the inflation of seed prices in the local, informal market. Some 
farmers noted it was more difficult to obtain seed from their neighbors before the fair, and that the 
fairs were increasing local prices even after the market. However, the evidence for this was ambiguous. 
As indicated in the figures above, the prices of seed at the fairs was substantially higher than prices for 
related grain in local markets. Unexpectedly, given the national grain shortages and hyperinflationary 
environment, grain prices during the February hunger season were still commonly less than the seed 
prices set during the fairs scheduled four to five months earlier (Table 7).
Table 7. Comparison of seed prices before, during and after the seed fair
Districts
Sorghum (ZW$/kg) Groundnut (ZW$/kg)
Before
(Oct. 05)
During
(Oct. 05)
After
(Feb. 06)
Before 
(Oct. 05)
During
(Oct. 05)
After
(Feb. 06)
Mutoko  6000 30000 20000 30000 80000 50000
Murehwa 15000 30000 50000 30000 80000 70000
Chiredzi  6000 30000 10000 35000 80000 40000
Tsholotsho  6000 30000 20000 30000 60000 65000
Nyanga  6000 15000 - 30000 75000 80000
Chirumhanzu 10000 30000 25000 30000 50000 75000
Gutu  4000 20000 40000 20000 50000 31000
Chipinge\a 6000 20000 - 20000 80000 -
Chivi\a 6000 30000 - 40000 150000 -
\a There were no seller respondents in Chipinge and Chivi during the post-planting surveys.
Impacts of Seed Fairs
The impacts of seed fairs can be measured in several different ways. Did the seed fairs provide farmers 
with greater choice and did the recipients make use of this choice? Was seed chosen at the fairs more 
likely to be planted? Did this contribute to the maintenance or expansion of agro-biodiversity? Did seed 
fairs contribute significantly to community incomes, and how was this income used? Did the seed fairs, 
correspondingly, stimulate an expansion of local seed production? Have they improved the operations of 
village seed markets?
Seed Choices in Seed Fairs and Direct Distribution
Proponents of using seed fairs to facilitate the distribution of relief seed have argued that the method 
provides farmers with a wider choice of seed types – including many traditional crops and varieties 
produced by local farmers. This proposition is a straightforward product of how the two strategies are 
implemented. 
In each of the nine districts covered, at least five different crop types were available for purchase at the 
seed fairs (Table 8). There were also multiple varieties of each crop sold. In comparison, only one seed crop 
was provided through direct distribution in four of the nine districts sampled. Others offered two, three or 
four seed types. Five seed types were distributed in only one district – but not to individual farmers. Some 
farmers received some of these seeds, and others received a different selection. 
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Table 8.  Crop types and varieties delivered at seed fairs and direct distribution
District
Seed fair Direct distribution
Number of crops sold Number of varieties sold Number of crops delivered Number of varieties delivered
Mutoko 7 12 2 2
Murehwa 9 13 1 1
Chiredzi 8 18 4 4
Tsholotsho 7 11 4 4
Nyanga 9 18 4 4
Chirumhanzu 5 15 1 1
Gutu 6 12 1 1
Chipinge 10 11 1 1
Chivi 16 8 5 5
Unexpectedly, virtually no maize seed was brought into the fairs for sale. Open pollinated maize had been 
distributed free to large numbers of farmers in the previous three years. This was assumed to be a major 
benefit, because farmers could replant seed from their previous season’s harvest, and would not have to 
purchase maize seed each season. Farmers short of seed could readily obtain it from their neighbors. In 
practice, however, this trade did not occur in the fairs. And questions were raised about the preferences 
of farmers for open pollinated seed versus hybrid varieties. 
The failure of farmers to bring maize seed for sale may partly have resulted from their continuing confusion 
about the difference between hybrid seed and open pollinated varieties. Many farmers may have thought 
the open pollinated varieties distributed in earlier years were, in fact, hybrids. The reluctance to sell this 
seed may also have resulted from unhappiness with the performance of open pollinated varieties previously 
distributed. And some farmers appear to have been discouraged from bringing maize seed for sale, because 
they were told in advance that outside companies would bring this input. Yet given a choice, the field 
evidence suggests that most farmers prefer to obtain their maize seed from companies, rather than from 
neighboring farmers. This helps assure seed quality, and potentially provides access to new varieties.
Likelihood that Relief Seed is Planted
Though farmers had access to more seed crops and varieties at the fairs, the dominance of maize in 
most fairs limited the selection of seed actually made. Overall, farmers selected more different types of 
seed than were obtained through the direct distribution programs. But most obtained only three seed 
types – commonly two cereal grains (maize and one other) and one legume. The limited number of seed 
selections resulted, in large part, from the high costs of maize seed, and the limited value of the vouchers 
available after this purchase was completed.
Farmers who obtained seed from seed fairs tended to plant a higher proportion of this than farmers 
who received their seed through free, direct distribution. Seed fair participants planted at least 80% of 
the total quantity of seed purchased with vouchers at the fairs (Figure 7). Farmers in neighboring wards 
without seed fairs planted an average of only 70% of the seed they received through direct distribution 
programs. This difference was particularly marked in the case of maize seed. Seed fair recipients planted 
90% of the maize seed they received whereas direct seed recipients planted only 55% of this seed. The 
justification for a differential of this size is unclear. Virtually all of the seed fair derived pearl millet, finger 
millet and groundnut were planted. In contrast, only about 70% of the groundnut handed out directly to 
farmers was planted.
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Unexpectedly, the majority of cowpea seed obtained from the fairs was not planted, whereas most of 
the cowpea seed directly distributed was planted. This is because farmers were inclined to consume 
the cowpea seed from the fairs, whereas they would not consume the treated seed obtained from the 
commercial market – and distributed by NGOs. 
Impact on the Diversity of Crops and Varieties Planted
One of the advantages cited for seed fairs is that they preserve agro-biodiversity in local farming systems. 
Seed sellers are encouraged to bring a wide range of seed crops and crop varieties including traditional 
varieties that are no longer widely grown. Sellers are encouraged to teach buyers about the varying 
characteristics of the range of these varieties still available. The fact that seed of a wider range of crops 
and varieties is available is assumed to contribute to agro-biodiversity.
The seed fairs clearly offered a wider range of crops and varieties to recipient farmers than the direct 
distribution programs. The question remains, however, did these contribute to the production of a wider 
range of crops and varieties? It is possible that farmers receiving seed through direct distribution could 
obtain the same wider set of seed crops and varieties from the informal village market without a seed fair, 
although the fairs were expected to improve seed access to poorer, more vulnerable households. 
Table 9 compares the number of crops and varieties planted for beneficiaries of seed fairs and beneficiaries 
of direct free seed distribution. Contrary to expectations, farmers obtaining seed through free, direct 
distribution were marginally more likely to plant more crops and more varieties than farmers obtaining 
seed through the seed fairs. These relationships hold true irrespective of the rainfall zone or the district. 
Even in drier regions where farmers are assumed to lose more seed, the fairs do not appear to have 
contributed to agro-biodiversity. 
Figure 7. Proportion of seed planted in 2005.
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Table 9. Crop types and varieties planted by beneficiaries of seed fairs and direct distribution programs
District
Seed fair Direct distribution
Number of crops Number of varieties Number of crops Number of varieties 
High rainfall Mutoko 3.8 4.3 3.3 4.6
Murehwa 4.2 5.4 3.3 4.6
Nyanga 4.8 5.5 6.1 7.5
Chirumhanzu 4.1 5.3 3.9 5.0
Gutu 4.4 5.3 5.5 7.5
Mean 4.3 5.2 4.4 5.8
Low rainfall Chiredzi 3.3 3.9 3.8 4.9
Tsholotsho 4.6 5.6 4.3 4.9
Chipinge 2.9 3.6 3.5 3.7
Chivi 3.7 4.5 5.9 6.9
Mean 3.7 4.4 4.4 5.1
The limited contribution of the fairs to agro-biodiversity could, in part, be a product of the dominance 
of maize seed sales in the fairs. But this may as well be an indication that village seed markets work 
reasonably well without the fairs. In effect, the seed fairs complement the range of other seed sources 
available to farmers in these environments. 
Community Seed Preferences
Farmers were asked what seed crops and varieties they wanted, but could not obtain at the seed fairs. 
The results are shown in Figure 8. The most sought after seed types were groundnut, bambaranut and 
cowpea. Although agro-dealers and seed companies provided large quantities of maize seed in most seed 
fairs, 14% of the respondents claimed they did not have access to their preferred variety. 
Figure 8. Crop types preferred but not available for purchase at seed fairs.
18
The failure to obtain preferred seed crops resulted from several factors. First, since much of the voucher 
resource was allocated to maize, farmers had less resources than they had hoped to purchase seed of 
other crops – particularly the legume crops.
Second, farmers complained that if they were near the end of the queue to collect their maize seed, 
preferred seed crops and varieties were sold out. Again, this was more likely in the event of legume crops 
than for the cereal grains. 
Third, although many farmers preferred to purchase hybrid maize seed, most agro- dealers delivered 
OPV maize seed. Therefore, even though farmers received maize seed, some were unhappy with the 
variety. Ninety percent of the farmers stating a preference for alternative maize varieties at the seed fairs 
claimed they wanted hybrids instead of open pollinated varieties. 
Farmers attending seed fairs and obtaining seed through direct distribution were also directly asked about 
their preferences for hybrids versus open pollinated maize. Figure 9 summarizes what varieties were 
commonly obtained by farmers through the two strategies. Almost 80% of the maize seed distributed 
through direct distribution programs in the sample areas was open pollinated. Yet, as seen in Figure 
10, only 10% of these farmers preferred these open pollinated maize seed offerings. In the seed fairs, 
approximately one-half of the seed distributed was of open pollinated varieties. Yet less than 5% of the 
recipients expressed a preference for this seed.
These results are surprising given that the open pollinated maize varieties on offer have been widely tested 
in on-farm trials. Farmers participating in these trials have expressed interest in these varieties. It is possible 
that many farmers wrongly assumed that what they were testing was hybrid seed. And many may be 
confused about the differences between open pollinated and hybrid seed. However, the history of hybrid 
maize seed usage in the country testifies to the widespread acceptance of these varieties. By 1985, more 
than 90% of farmers in the country were regularly buying hybrid maize seed. New purchases have declined 
in recent years because of the high costs of seed, and its limited availability on rural markets. But it is 
possible that most farmers still recognize the value of hybrid vigor and, given the choice, prefer this trait.
Figure 9. Types of maize varieties received through seed fairs and direct distribution.
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Figure 10. Types of maize varieties preferred by farmers who received OPV maize seed.
Community Income from Seed Sales
Proponents of seed fairs also argue that these are better than direct seed distribution because they 
stimulate the development of local seed markets. They encourage farmers involved in seed trade to 
produce more seed for their neighbors. Money paid to local seed producers offers multiplied gains to 
the local community – adding employment and income. However, overall, more than 85% of the income 
derived from the seed sales went to external commercial retailers – mostly for maize seed (Figures 11 and 
12). Less than 15% of the income earned through the seed fairs remained in the hands of local farmers. 
Therefore, the multiplier effects of seed fairs were much smaller than anticipated.
The impact of the seed fairs on the area planted remains ambiguous. Two-thirds of the local farmer seed 
sellers interviewed during the post-planting survey claimed they had increased the area of land they 
planted during the 2005/06 cropping season (Table 10). The largest gains were said to have occurred in 
the planting of legume crops such as cowpea, bambaranut and groundnut – varieties sought from local 
traders in the fairs. However, much of this gain appears to have been linked with the better-than-average 
rainfall experienced this year. Only one third of the seed sellers claimed they were expanding their 
plantings in order to sell more seed at future seed fairs. 
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Table 10. Proportion of seed sellers changing the area planted after participating in seed fairs
Change in area planted (%)
Large decline Small decline No change Small increase Large increase
White sorghum 3.8 15.4 15.4 19.2 46.2
Pearl millet 6.7 13.3 13.3 33.3 33.3
Groundnut 3.8 17.0 11.3 13.2 54.7
Cowpea 8.3  8.3  8.3  8.3 66.7
Bambaranut 8.6 2.9 14.3 14.3 60.0
Figure 11. Proportional value of different seed crops sold at seed fairs, 2005
Figure 12. Proportion of total income earned by external traders versus local farmer sellers.
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Investment of Cash Earned by Seed Sellers
A review of what local seed traders did with the income they earned from the fairs revealed that only 
one-third of these traders claimed to be using this income to purchase crop inputs (Figure 13). Two-thirds 
of the respondents allocated this income primarily to other non-farm goods such as food and groceries 
and educational expenses. 
This result may partly reflect the nature of the local seed market. Much of the seed sold in this market 
is simply extra seed or grain produced by better-than-average households. Very few farmers set out to 
produce a seed crop for sale to their neighbors – even among those known in local communities to be 
likely sources of seed. In the few communities where seed may be produced on contract for a company, 
or an external organization, this commodity is simply viewed as another cash crop with higher quality 
requirements.
Figure 13. Proportion of respondents citing use of income earned from seed sales
Impact on Local Seed Markets
Seed fairs are commonly perceived to enhance the operations of the informal village seed market. 
However, the impacts identified by both seed sellers and seed buyers were ambiguous, at best. 
Seed fairs encouraged a subset of sellers to invest in crop inputs and expand their crop area in order to 
sell more seed in the future. However, this appears to have been a small minority of the participating 
households – less than one-third. Most sellers simply view the fairs as an opportunity to sell surplus crop 
if it is available. 
A number of seed ‘buyers’ raised concerns about the impacts of the seed fairs on local markets. While 
45% claimed that seed fairs increased the availability of seed by making village stocks more accessible, 
one third reported greater difficulty in obtaining seed from their neighbors (Table 11). Apparently, once 
the fair is announced, some seed sellers hold back seed from the village market in the hope of obtaining 
higher prices in the NGO mediated fair. 
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Table 11. Perceived impacts of seed fairs on local markets 
Market parameters
Impact (%)
Increases No impact Decreases
Availability of seed 45 21 34
Price of seed 60 10 30
Willingness to provide seed to neighbors 45 36 19
Correspondingly, two thirds of the vulnerable recipient households reported that seed fairs increase the 
price of seed at the local market. Many expressed fear that the fairs have undermined traditional seed 
exchange in the village. Historically, farmers would help one another with seed gifts or provide seed in 
exchange for labor. The fairs are encouraging farmers with surplus to demand higher cash payments. More 
farmers are willing to provide seed to their neighbors, but these transactions are increasingly in exchange 
for cash. This could reduce the seed security of the most vulnerable households in the medium term.
Cost Effectiveness of Seed Fairs versus Direct Distribution
Although seed fairs are becoming more common, some NGOs and donors continue to be concerned 
about the cost effectiveness of these operations. The main objective of relief seed programs is to get 
the largest quantity of seed to the largest number of vulnerable households within a limited budget. 
Some argue that seed fairs are more expensive than direct distribution because of the additional costs of 
organizing and implementing the markets. As a result, fewer farmers may benefit from the humanitarian 
funds available.
The following analysis of the cost effectiveness of seed fair operations is based on a case study of two 
NGOs conducting both seed fairs and direct distribution. The analysis of costs is based on a program to 
provide each of 1700 households in one district with a package of seed inputs comprising 10 kg of hybrid 
maize seed, 5 kg of sorghum seed, and 5 kg of groundnut seed. This package represents a common sort 
of seed pack used by a number of NGOs in Zimbabwe for direct seed distribution. Five possible sources 
of seed are considered: (a) the local farm community for seed fairs, (b) local agro-dealers at seed fairs, 
(c) local commercial seed company agents at seed fairs, (d) local commercial seed companies for direct 
distribution, and (e) imported seed for direct distribution.
Labor Requirements
Three major categories of activities were identified: the seed needs assessment, the organization of the 
distribution, and the implementation of seed distribution (Table 12). This analysis assumes that the staff 
skills required for each type of distribution program are approximately similar. This allows the labor days 
to be consistently valued. The travel costs cited in Table 12 are a product of the number of trips required 
for these operations.
During the seed needs assessment, the implementing NGO travels to the community and evaluates the 
need for seed and numbers of households requiring assistance. Since this process is similar, regardless of 
the strategy for seed supply employed, the costs (eight labor days – two persons for four days per district) 
are assumed to be the same.
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Table 12. Labor requirements and travel costs for one district distributing seed packs to 1700 households
Item Unit costs (US$)
Seed fairs Direct distribution
Quantity Value (US$) Quantity Value (US$)
Labor Seed assessment 25/labor day 8 200 8 200
Organization 25/labor day 8 200 4 100
Implementation 25/labor day 40 1000 8 200
Total labor costs 1400 500
Travel 0.25/km 1000 250 600 150
Total costs 1650 650
However, the labor demands underlying the organization of the distribution program differ. Similar efforts 
may be required to register beneficiaries. But since seed fairs are new, more time is needed to explain how 
the fair will be run. In addition, more time is needed to organize seed sellers involved in the fairs, prepare 
the vouchers and organize the seed inspection. The collective estimate of labor requirements required for 
organizing the distribution programs suggests that the fairs are approximately twice as labor demanding 
as direct distribution. 
Implementing seed fairs also demands more labor. Direct distribution encompasses issuing inputs, and 
signing a beneficiary register to confirm receipt of seed. In most cases, community leaders assist in the 
verification of registered beneficiaries and issuing out of input packages. Seed fairs include registration of 
sellers, weighing of seed, inspection of seed, issuing of vouchers, checking of sales, and payment of sellers. 
Additional NGO personnel are required to coordinate and monitor the process. The collective estimate 
indicates that seed fairs are approximately five times more labor intensive to implement than the direct 
distribution program.
Based on the organization and implementation costs alone, the seed fairs are approximately 2.5 times 
more expensive to run than a direct seed distribution program. 
Materials Required
Several sorts of materials are required for the implementation of these programs in addition to seed. 
These include the printing of vouchers, stationery, scales and promotional materials (Table 13). Again, 
more materials are required for the implementation of seed fairs compared with direct distribution 
programs. The latter, of course, require no vouchers. While seed provided through direct distribution is 
generally pre-packaged and weighed, the seed fair requires the hiring of scales suitable for a variable range 
of seed lots. Since farmers at the fair have a choice of seeds to purchase, more promotional materials tend 
to be prepared explaining such options.
Table 13. Costs of materials for one district distributing seed packs to 1700 households
Item Cost for seed fairs (US$) Cost for direct distribution (US$)
Printing of vouchers 170 0
Stationery 100 50
Hiring scales   40 0
Advertising and promotional 100 50
Total 410 100
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The costs of materials were calculated assuming the distribution of 17,000 kg of maize seed, 8500 kg 
of sorghum seed and 8500 kg of groundnut seed to the 1700 targeted vulnerable households. Roughly 
estimated, the materials needed for seed fairs cost approximately four times more than the materials 
needed for direct distribution programs. 
Seed Costs 
The cost of seed depends on whether it was imported, bought from commercial seed companies, or was 
locally grown and delivered by farmers at seed fairs. While recognizing that farmers at seed fairs may 
choose any configuration of seed, for comparison purposes a standard ‘pack’ was assumed to include 10 kg 
of hybrid maize seed, 5 kg of sorghum seed, and 5 kg of groundnut seed. This approximately corresponds 
with the value of vouchers distributed. 
Not surprisingly, the costs of imported seed (US$24/pack) were far more expensive than any other 
option (Table 14). In comparison, packs of seed obtained from the local community were the cheapest 
option at US$8.72/pack. 
Table 14. Costs of seed packs by source 
Item Units
Seed fair Direct distribution
Local
community
Local 
Agro-dealer
Local 
commercial Local commercial Imported
Seed prices 
per unit
Maize ZW$/kg 30 000 36 000 28 000 28 000 81 250
Sorghum ZW$/kg 9 000 35 000 26 000 26 000 43 750
Groundnut ZW$/kg 40 000 93 000 80 000 80 000 93 750
Cost of input 
pack
Maize ZW$/10kg 300 000 360 000 280 000 280 000 812 500
Sorghum ZW$/5kg 45 000 175 000 130 000 130 000 218 750
Groundnut ZW$/5kg 200 000 465 000 400 000 400 000 468 750
Total ZW$/pack 545 000 1 000 000 810 000 810 000 1 500 000
US$/pack\a 8.72 16.00 12.96 12.96 24.00
Cost of 1700 packs US$ 14 824 27 200 22 032 22 032 40 800
\a US$1 = ZW$62,500
The cost of buying seed through agro-dealers was more expensive (US$16/pack) than the costs of buying 
seed directly from the national seed companies (US$12.95/pack). This is because agro-dealers sought 
higher prices in order to offset their transport costs, accommodation costs and the risk of ending up with 
unsold inventories. 
The analysis indicates that if seed was provided by seed companies, either through direct distribution 
or through the seed fairs, the cost would be the same. However, as noted above, seed companies were 
reluctant to service most seed fairs because of the uncertainty of sales and the higher profitability of 
selling larger lots in response to NGO tenders. By inference, the more relevant comparison is between 
agro-dealer sales at the fairs versus seed company deliveries for direct distribution. 
Cost Summary
The most expensive component of these comparative budgets is the cost of seed. This largely determines 
the overall costs of each program. The most cost effective means to provide the designated seed pack 
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to the 1700 targeted households is through seed fairs wherein all seed is provided by local farmers 
(Table 15). Use of imported seed in direct seed distribution is the most expensive option. The high 
costs of imported seed, and added logistical expenses involved in finding this seed, obtaining appropriate 
clearances, and shipping and handling, push the value of imported seed to almost twice the cost of local 
commercial seed.
The cheapest means to distribute seed to needy households appears to be the option of using seed fairs 
to redistribute stocks from surplus to deficit households. This is almost 30% cheaper than the next best 
alternative of direct distribution of commercially supplied seed. However, this assumes that all of the 
seed needed is locally available. 
Table 15. Total costs of distributing sorghum seed to 1700 households (US$)
Item
Seed fair Direct distribution
Local community Local agro-dealer Local commercial Local commercial Imported
Labor 1400 1400 1400   500   500
Travel   250   250   250   150   150
Materials   410   410   410   100   100
Seed\a 14 824 27 200 22 032 22 032 40 800 
Total 16 884 29 260 24 092 22 782 41 550 
Cost/Household 9.93 17.21 14.17 13.40 24.44
\a Including shipping and handling
If NGOs and donors want commercial seed to be distributed, the most cost effective means to accomplish 
this is through direct distribution of stocks obtained from seed companies. The reliance on local agro-
dealers to provide this seed through seed fairs is relatively expensive. 
An alternative choice would be to provide some seed (eg, maize) through commercial channels and the 
rest of the seed (eg, sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut, cowpea) through a fair. This has the advantage of 
strengthening commercial sales channels while also supporting local markets. 
The key question is whether or not seed is readily available in local communities for distribution. Is 
humanitarian assistance needed to supply seed to communities without adequate stocks? Or is the 
primary need to enhance the purchasing power of vulnerable farmers – for example with vouchers? 
The answer to these questions may depend on the crop considered. High-quality maize seed may not be 
readily available in local communities, but stocks of sorghum or pearl millet seed may be adequate. This 
may justify the distribution of maize seed obtained from commercial companies, whereas sorghum or 
pearl millet seed are obtained through local markets.
Alternatively, one may find that a series of new well-adapted and well-tested sorghum or pearl millet 
varieties are available on the commercial market, but are not available to most small-scale farmers because 
of the limited development of rural seed markets. The purchase of this commercial seed may offer a 
primary means to promote the dissemination of these more productive offerings. 
This is essentially how such well-accepted varieties as Macia sorghum and Okashana 1 pearl millet were 
originally disseminated. Farmers would not have obtained access to these varieties without previous 
relief programs. 
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Ultimately, the analysis of cost effectiveness must be complemented with an assessment of additional 
costs and benefits that are more difficult to quantify. There is little doubt but that direct distribution 
undermines the development of rural retail markets. Seed companies seek to sell most of their stocks in 
larger lots to each NGO. This contributes to a reduction of flows through national wholesale and retail 
distribution channels. Rural retailers have little incentive to stock seed if this may be handed out for free 
in neighboring communities. 
Yet the development gains often attributed to seed fairs (eg, increasing community incomes, promoting 
local seed production and improving agro-biodiversity) appear to be overestimated. Seed fairs facilitate 
community seed trade. But they may be monetizing a traditional obligation to share limited seed stocks. 
There may be more seed on the informal community market, but its accessibility to poorer households 
may be diminished unless vouchers continue to be provided. The fairs appear to be inflating local seed 
prices and they do little to strengthen the stocking of seed in local retail shops. 
While seed fairs appear to offer advantages to direct seed distribution, substantial opportunities remain 
for their improvement. NGOs should be encouraged to test revised strategies, while formal monitoring 
systems assess the relative success of the various options. 
Possible Improvements in Seed Fair Strategies
Seed fairs are being implemented differently in Zimbabwe than in eastern Africa or neighboring 
Mozambique. These differences may be justified by disparities in national market conditions or seed 
supply. If farmers like commercially available varieties, and prioritize better access to this seed, there 
may be less justification for investing in the facilitation of informal, village seed markets. In a hyper-
inflationary environment there may be stronger justification for setting specific seed prices. If there is 
substantial uncertainty about the supply of specific seed crops, there may be a justification for setting 
prices at premium levels. Regardless, experimentation with alternative strategies for improving seed fair 
operations should be encouraged. The analysis provides a series of clues about opportunities for this 
experimentation in Zimbabwe. 
1. Commercial versus Farm Saved Seed
Seed fairs started in eastern Africa in large part as a response to questions about the suitability of varieties 
available on the commercial market for many drought-prone regions. While questions have been raised 
about the productivity and acceptability of several of the varieties available on Zimbabwe’s commercial 
market, most of the seed varieties on offer have been well tested and broadly accepted in the smallholder 
community – even in highly drought-prone regions. In fact, farmers have historically looked to relief 
programs as a means to obtain fresh seed of well-known commercial varieties, or access to new varieties.
The main difficulty with this strategy is the lack of high-quality commercial seed stocks for crops other 
than maize. Seed companies tend to limit their production of seed for sorghum, pearl millet, groundnut, 
cowpea or bambaranut because they do not believe they can sell this seed when the relief programs end. 
They argue that farmers will simply replant seed obtained from their previous season’s harvest. 
This problem is reinforced by the sale of lower cost, poor quality seed in response to NGO tenders. 
Companies with higher quality seed stocks sometimes lose tenders to companies offering grain cleaned to 
seed specification. The proclivity of NGOs to purchase low-quality seed is reinforced by the opportunity 
this creates to provide more seed to more farmers. Few recognize the risks involved. 
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Insofar as one of the objectives of these programs is to improve the productivity and food security of 
smallholder cropping systems, stronger efforts are needed to assure supply of the best new varieties. 
This implies closer planning with seed companies to assure these stocks are available, and possibly a joint 
investment in the establishment of seed security stocks of the best new varieties (to supplement common 
investments in grain security stocks). NGOs need to learn about the suitability of the range of varieties 
available on the national market, and encourage seed companies to produce and supply the best possible 
options. In seed fairs, farmers should be given a clear choice of whether to purchase a range of products 
from the commercial companies, or to purchase this seed from their neighbors. 
2. Maize Hybrids versus Open Pollinated Varieties
The survey evidence questions the common assumption that small-scale farmers prefer open pollinated 
maize varieties. In fact, when provided a clear choice, many chose maize hybrids. This reflects the fact 
that Zimbabwe’s farmers almost universally planted maize hybrids in the years after independence. Given 
a free choice, most appear inclined to continue planting hybrids.
However, there are several sources of ambiguity in this evidence. First, many farmers seem to remain 
uncertain about whether the varieties on offer are in fact hybrids or open pollinated. Correspondingly, 
the choices being made may reflect preferences for specific varieties rather than preferences for hybrid 
versus open pollinated varieties per se. 
Second, farmers recognize the high-quality standards of maize seed offered by several larger commercial 
seed companies. The apparent preference for hybrids may also reflect greater trust in the offerings of the 
more established seed companies as opposed to their smaller rivals. 
The main objective here should be to help farmers make a more informed choice. NGOs seem to have 
had difficulties communicating the distinctions between hybrid and open pollinated varieties. This 
information needs to be better presented. But, in addition, farmers may be provided with more seed 
choices, and encouraged to experiment with different options. Rather than providing a single variety in a 
10 kg packet, farmers may benefit from a choice of varieties in 2 or 5 kg packets.
3. Choice of Delivery Systems
As several NGOs have shown, the choice of distribution strategy is not a simple either–or selection. Some 
seed may best be distributed through commercial channels, whereas other seed may be distributed via seed 
fairs. Again, the choice of strategy may depend on the differing market circumstances for different crops. 
Zimbabwe has long had a well-developed wholesale and retail distribution system for hybrid maize. 
But this has been undermined by the consistency and magnitude of the recent relief seed programs. 
Companies have little incentive to market their seed through commercial distribution channels as long 
as they can sell most of it from the warehouse through competitive tenders. This preference has been 
reinforced by market uncertainties associated with hyper-inflation and with government interventions in 
both seed sales and seed pricing.
Yet the maintenance of strong wholesale and retail distribution channels remains essential both to improve 
longer term seed security and to maintain productivity growth in the larger agricultural sector. NGO 
programs should endeavor to support the maintenance of these markets, while extending seed availability 
to remoter regions. One way to achieve this is to assure that all maize seed flows through commercial 
channels. At a minimum, seed companies should be encouraged to participate directly in more seed fairs. 
Even better, vouchers should be redeemable for maize seed at rural retail shops. 
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Similarly, the use of local agro-dealers who might continue selling seed in rural communities in future 
years should be encouraged. These include local agents for seed companies. But this does not necessarily 
include agro-dealers based in Harare. The latter appear less likely to continue marketing seed after relief 
programs end. These traders also tend to have less information about the commodities they are selling. 
In practice, many NGOs were already implementing mixed programs. Much of the maize seed was 
provided by a single dominant trader, while farmers had a choice of multiple sources of seed for a wider 
range of varieties of other crops. The natural next step would be to allow the redemption of maize 
vouchers through local retailers and the support sales of other seed crops in the fairs. 
4. Seed Pricing
In contrast to the free market strategies employed in seed fairs around the continent, seed prices were 
set at the beginning of the fair in Zimbabwe. And in practice, seed prices were set at fairly high levels 
in order to assure adequate quantities of seed were attracted to the market. This assumption, however, 
merits a challenge. It is not obvious why seed fairs in other countries work with freely negotiated prices 
between each individual buyer and seller, yet this will not work in Zimbabwe. 
NGOs ought to test the practice of open market prices – whereby the cost of each transaction may 
be negotiated between buyer and seller. This allows prices to reflect quality differences and it allows 
premiums to be paid for preferred varieties. 
NGOs can work to reduce the risks of not having enough seed to sell through several means. One is to 
more broadly advertise the dates and locations of seed fairs. Several traders and companies interviewed 
claimed they did not know of the existence of most seed fairs. Nor did they understand what seed crops 
could be sold. 
In some communities, local seed sellers also need more information, and possibly a larger incentive to 
bring in their stocks. Some farmers were reluctant to bring their seed because they were afraid of being 
disqualified from receiving food aid. Better communication with both prospective sellers and community 
leaders should aim to dispel this perception. But, in addition, a positive incentive may be created by 
providing seed sellers with special access to small amounts of seed of new varieties, or access to specialized 
advice on seed production.  
While NGOs sometimes express worries that inadequate quantities of seed may be available from the 
driest agro-ecologies, the evidence for this claim is ambiguous. It is hard to tell whether seed is not brought 
to the fair because it is simply not available, or because farmers are reluctant to expose their stocks. The 
pattern of continuing reliance on own saved seed, even in the driest regions of the country, suggests the 
latter explanation is more likely. But NGOs most worried about local supplies may still offset their risks 
by carrying at least limited stocks of seed crops (eg, legumes) most likely to be limited.
5. Strengthening Informal Community Seed Markets 
Seed fairs were originally promoted by NGOs as means to strengthen seed exchange on informal 
community markets. The strategy sought to increase trade of traditional varieties and enhance biodiversity. 
The extension of this technique to support relief seed distribution with vouchers risks undermining these 
efforts. It also appears to be changing the character of village seed markets. 
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The seed trade is being monetized. Whereas seed transactions following drought traditionally took the 
form of gifts and exchanges for labor, these are now shifting to exchanges for cash backed vouchers. 
The associated impacts on seed supply and access merit closer monitoring. The fairs have undoubtedly 
contributed to the escalation of seed prices. While the fairs are stimulating the delivery of more seed 
into the NGO facilitated market, this may also be contributing to a reduction of offerings between 
households. Some vulnerable households have complained that farmers with a seed surplus are refusing 
to share their seed in the hopes of selling it in the seed fair as a cash crop.
Similarly, the impact of the fairs on local production remains limited. Approximately one third of local 
traders claim to be expanding their production for future seed fairs, the majority of participants are 
applying their profits to the purchase of other consumer goods.  
Seed fairs have probably improved the welfare of vulnerable households by making it easier to obtain seed. 
But insofar as community seed markets worked reasonably well before the advent of this intervention, 
the net gain in welfare may be small. Without the fair, most of these households would still have obtained 
seed from their neighbors. 
Much larger gains may be achieved by strengthening efforts to improve community seed production. 
This would improve seed availability even in years without humanitarian aid. Larger gains may also be 
derived from strengthening the flow of new varieties into these markets – allowing broader choice of seed 
varieties.  
6. Implementation Procedures
Various stakeholders have offered several suggestions regarding possible improvements in the procedures 
for seed fair implementation. First, many buyers complained that they had to rush to select their seed 
and needed more time to make their choices. A number asked that seed fairs be organized on multiple 
days. This is difficult if close NGO monitoring is required, but not impossible. If maize seed is stocked 
with a local retailer, vouchers may be redeemed over a period of weeks. Local seed of a wider array of 
varieties can similarly be sold over an extended period at a village market place. If preferred seed is not 
available, the NGOs have more time to facilitate the delivery of stocks from more distant sources. 
Farmers redeeming vouchers also complained about being unable to purchase seed of preferred crops or 
varieties if they were at the end of the queue. There may be scope for initiating the redemption process 
with older and weaker farmers, while stronger participants are queued later. 
Finally, there is the question of choice. A number of voucher recipients complained that they were 
required to purchase a particular variety of maize seed. In one community, farmers were reluctant to 
discuss the seed fair during the post-planting period because much of the seed had been consumed. 
This was not to avert starvation, but because seed shortages in the community were simply not severe. 
Vouchers are being offered as a means to improve the choice of seed to needy households. Yet the vibrancy 
of local markets suggests that seed may not be the agricultural input in shortest supply. Experimentation 
is merited with the provision of wider choices for voucher redemption including small packs of fertilizer, 
plowing services and even basic food items.
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